Dictators' survival depends on the effectiveness of their coup-proofing tactics. Yet, coup-proofing strategies can become ineffective in the presence of certain structural conditions that enhance the resources, organizational power, and coordination capacity of the army. One such structural condition is the presence of spatial rivalry, international rivalry over disputed territory. Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary.
'loyalty' option,"
13 while McMahon and Slantchev argue that external threats help induce military loyalty and, thus, lower the probability of a coup.
14 Some propose that a highly militarized international environment allows dictators to deploy potential coup plotters into the war zone, create rifts among officers and, hence, secure control of the military establishment. 15 Others contend that wars, or even militarized interstate disputes, complicate coup plotting and execution, and focus officers' attention outward. 16 A common, diversionary war, argument posits that conflict generates coup-inhibiting "rally-around-the-flag" effects and unifies the civilian leadership with the military (the public tends to be averse to coups during periods of international instability). 17 Further, a more recent claim holds that, during high-hostility crises, leaders can commit more credibly to substantial resource transfers towards the military top-brass, which is likely to be appeased and, thus, less inclined to contemplate ousting the leader. 18 Moreover, Pilster and Böhmelt argue that a challenging international environment "reduces the probability of agency drifts in the form of military coups and increases the political costs from a loss of military effectiveness. External threats 13 Desch, "War and Strong States," 241.
14 McMahon and Slantchev, "The Guardianship Dilemma," 307. According to McMahon and Slantchev, the military's willingness to remain loyal to the leader is complicated by uncertainty about the external threat environment. In their view, rulers are able to strengthen their militaries without triggering a coup only when there is common knowledge about threat severity. McMahon and Slantchev embrace a broader understanding of external threats as threats originating from outside the government; hence, "external" threats can be domestic or foreign.
15 Belkin and Schofer, "Coup Risk," 151; Chiozza and Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict;
Goemans, "Which Way Out?," 775.
16 Piplani and Talmadge, "When War Helps," 18.
17 On leaders' diversionary incentives, see Amy Oakes, Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
18 Arbatli and Arbatli, "External Threats and Political Survival." As discussed below, the credible commitment mechanism can also produce an expectation in the opposite direction: during times of external hostility, leaders can commit to resource disbursements towards the military, but the substantial resources allocated to the army can also be used to topple a dictator.
can therefore be expected to reduce the need for and attractiveness of institutional coupproofing as an ex-ante control mechanism." 19 Finally, McMahon conjectures that external threats tend to induce regime loyalty within the military establishment. In his view, when external threats are particularly severe, officers "prefer to remain loyal rather than undertake the risks and assume the costs associated with a coup."
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This article reveals that it's not the mere presence but the nature or the type of external threat that seems to matter for autocratic leader survival. Different types of external threats have different kinds of domestic consequences. In the presence of territorial rivalries, dictators may be less successful at implementing coup-proofing measures. When the regime is locked in international competition over territory, authoritarian leaders are compelled to allocate greater resources to the army even when domestic incentives to undermine the power of the military establishment -for instance through the creation of parallel coercive units -are quite pressing. Because of its symbolic, strategic, or material value, nondemocratic regimes cannot avoid placing high value on contested territory and endowing the military with the resources needed to compete with foreign opponents. The same organizational practices that dictators adopt to enhance military preparedness leave the army organizationally empowered to launch and successfully execute a coup. Therein lies a harrowing dilemma for the autocrat entangled in spatial rivalries: a strong and competent army is needed to successfully manage territorial disputes; at the same time, an army strong enough to compete with foreign enemies is also strong enough to threaten a dictator's tenure. tional practices that increase the chances of military success; 22 yet, these practices likely undermine the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures, and fundamentally shape the army's ability to carry out a coup.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first section discusses how autocrats' coup-proofing strategies (counterbalancing, loyalty buy-off, ethnic stacking) can be eroded by both domestic and external structural conditions. The second section examines the mechanisms through which spatial rivalry can create favorable circumstances for the army to attempt and successfully execute a coup against a dictator. Following that, the third section tests empirically the key proposition which anticipates a higher incidence of coups against autocrats in the presence of spatial rivalry. Finally, the last section concludes and offers suggestions for further research. nonviolent protests, 27 and by elements within the autocrat's selectorate -the set of individuals and institutions that guarantee a regime's survival. 28 Autocrats rule in the shadow of potential coups d'état executed by the military -their survival in power ultimately depends on the extent to which they keep the military weak or subservient. 29 The longevity of an autocrat's tenure is a function of the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures, the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup.
Autocrats and Coup-proofing
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To shield themselves from coups, autocrats are often compelled to weaken the army and erode the state building project. The three types of coup-proofing strategies are fairly common in authoritarian regimes spanning different regions and time periods. In countries from Iraq (1979 Iraq ( -2003 or the Philippines (1965 Philippines ( -1986 to Romania (1965 Romania ( -1989 or Egypt (1981 Egypt ( -2011 , autocrats relied on counterbalancing, loyalty buy-off, or ethnic stacking to reduce the capacity and motivation of the army to execute a coup d'état. Despite their prevalence, these tactics are not fail-proof because they require certain conditions to produce the desired outcome (coup prevention).
In fact, coup-proofing strategies can be ineffective in the presence of internal or external structural conditions that create problems of moral hazard. Put otherwise, the efforts aimed at keeping the army subservient will likely be unsuccessful when certain domestic or international conditions work to cement the organizational strength of the military. are more likely to exacerbate the problem of moral hazard in authoritarian regimes. Spatial rivalry is likely to be more salient than other types of rivalries due to the symbolic, strategic, or material qualities of the territory contested with a foreign adversary. 58 Symbolically, a disputed territory can be imbued with nationalist overtones and can be regarded as the source of group identity and survival. A contested area can be perceived as an "ancestral homeland," a "reservoir of national identity," or as a "place of belonging" that harbors widespread symbolic appeal with elites and masses alike. Strategically, the geographical location of a territory, for example its proximity to a rival's capital city or to international shipping lanes, imparts considerable military value. Materially, a disputed landmass can be economically valuable if it contains mineral resources or other types of taxable assets, such as an industrial infrastructure or large population. Because of its symbolic, strategic, and material value, authoritarian regimes cannot avoid placing high value on contested territory and endowing the military with the resources needed to compete with foreign adversaries. At the same time, the resources allocated for international competition over disputed territory are organizationally rewarding for the military establishment and can enable it to successfully orchestrate a coup against an autocratic leader. Therefore, resource allocation is the main mechanism through which spatial rivalry exacerbates the problem of moral hazard in dictatorial regimes and increases the army's ability to supply coups. In the presence of territorial disputes, autocrats are compelled to make substantial investments in their militaries. of inter-unit cooperation. Once seamless coordination among the top-brass and between the top-brass and the rank-and-file is accomplished, the military will be more confident in its efforts to maintain a strong posture vis-à-vis an international rival. At the same time, with greater inter-branch coordination, the military will also gain greater confidence in its ability to overthrow a nondemocratic ruler.
In general, coups are most likely to be initiated, and to succeed, at higher thresholds of plotter capacity. Because of territory's salience for domestic audiences, spatial rivalry consolidates the army's capacity, in terms of resources and inter-branch communication, not only to withstand a foreign opponent but also to plot a coup against an authoritarian leader.
These arguments do not imply that spatial rivalry invariably fosters homogeneous preferences within the military establishment regarding the institution's corporate interests and strategy vis-à-vis a domestic authoritarian leader. The armed forces are not organizational monoliths; in fact, many armies, especially those in nondemocratic countries, display some degree of factionalism within the officer corps, not least because of rulers' coup-proofing efforts.
64 While spatial rivalry may not automatically encourage preference homogenization regarding the army's domestic posture, the resources allocated to the military and the level of inter-branch coordination needed to confront a foreign adversary can be strategically utilized by segments of the top brass to oust an autocratic leader.
The high levels of army resources, professionalization, and coordination that can be achieved in spatial rivalry situations exacerbate the problem of credible commitment in authoritarian regimes. In dictatorships, civilian leaders have a hard time committing that they will safeguard the army's corporate interests while officers have a hard time committing that they will not plot regime overthrow. To summarize the theoretical rationales elaborated above, spatial rivalry widens the credibility gap between officers and dictators because it strenghens the army's organizational power and, hence, provides further incentives for authoritarian rulers to expand their coupproofing tactics. The deepening credible commitment predicament for autocratic regimes embroiled in territorial disputes can provide a fertile ground for a coup d'état. By consolidating army resources, fostering officer professionalization, and reducing coordination costs, spatial rivalry can undermine a dictator's coup-proofing tactics and can increase the army's ability to supply coups. Therefore, the main theoretical expectation to be tested holds that:
H: Coups against autocrats are more likely to be initiated and to be successful when the regime is engaged in spatial rivalry.
Dictators need strong armies to guard against external threats, but a strong military can undermine their coup-proofing strategies and leave them prone to being ousted. There are various processes through which spatial rivalry can undercut autocrats' coup-proofing plans.
As argued above, given the high salience of territorial competition, authoritarian leaders might be reluctant or unable to sideline the military establishment. 
Empirical Approach
The main hypothesis is tested using a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset for all nondemocratic regimes during the 1960-2006 period. The unit of analysis is the country-year.
Because of endogeneity problems and the rather arbitrary thresholds for regime type in the Polity IV data, I use the alternative measure for autocratic regimes developed by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz. 78 This is also known as the bivariate probit model with selection or the censored probit model. Censored probit is equivalent to running two probit models with correlated errors.
saving a selection bias term, and using it to correct the estimates in the outcome stage (coup success). If coup attempt and coup success are interdependent processes, the probit-probit selection model would account for this interdependence. To address the problem of countryspecific error correlations, I report robust standard errors clustered at the country level. One remaining challenge with this type of analysis is that the occurrence of a coup is unlikely to be independent of previous coups. To account for temporal dependence and structural coup risk (recurrent coups in the same country), I include a measure of the number of years since the previous coup with associated cubic splines.
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Variables
The dependent variables of interest, coup attempt and coup success, are taken from the most comprehensive coup dataset to date. 80 Coup attempt refers to an attempt "by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using unconstitutional means." A coup attempt is considered to be successful "if the perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days."
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The main hypothesis states that spatial rivalry is positively associated with coups. Spatial rivalry is coded 1 for each year an authoritarian regime was engaged in rivalry over territory, and 0 otherwise with (updated) data taken from Thompson. 82 According to Thompson's conceptualization, the onset of rivalry is marked by "explicit threat, competitor, and enemy perceptions on the part of decision-makers" while the termination of rivalry occurs when there is historical "evidence of some explicit kind of a significant de-escalation in threat perception and hostility." 83 To assess the veracity of main theoretical expectation, I also include binary indicators for other rivalry subtypes -positional, ideological, and interventionist -with information taken again from Thompson's updated dataset. The key argument holds that spatial rivalries are likely to produce organizationally coherent armies that can also act against the ruler when they find politically expedient to do so. By contrast, positional and ideological rivalries could plausibly be maintained without necessarily endowing the army with disproportionately large amounts of resources. These types of confrontations are less intense and frequently unfold in the political rather than the military realm. Given their reduced escalatory potential, they may not create the same level of demand for organizationally efficient armies as is the case with spatial rivalries. In the case of interventionist rivalries, the army tends to be weakened by the intervening state so, if anything, we might expect these types of rivalries to reduce the incidence of coups. Because a country can experience multiple types of rivalries at the same time, dichotomous indicators for all types of rivalries are included simultaneously in the model specifications.
Besides the presence of spatial rivalry, the theoretical discussion espoused three other structural conditions that can produce problems of moral hazard: domestic instability, civil war, and interstate conflict. Since each of them provides avenues for the military to consolidate its institutional power and carry out a coup against an authoritarian leader when the occasion arises, they need to be taken into consideration. To capture the impact of domestic instability on the army's institutional power, I rely on the anti-government resistance campaign variable from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset. 84 With an increase in domestic instability, an autocrat may be compelled to appeal anti-government campaigns which I recode according to the following categories: 1 <1,000 protestors; 2 <10,000 protestors; 3 <100,000 protestors; 4 <500,000 protestors; 5 <1 million protestors; 6 >1 million to the armed forces to quell uprisings. By doing so, however, the dictator may be exposed to the possibility of being ousted in a coup.
85
The impact of internal conflict on military consolidation is factored in through the civil 96 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown."
Results Table 1 displays the results from the two-stage Heckman selection model for attempted and successful coups against autocrats. 97 All models report probit coefficients. As argued in the recent literature, the covariates, with the exception of those capturing time since last coup or time since last MID, can be theoretically linked to both coup attempts and coup outcomes; 98 therefore, they enter both the selection and the outcome equations. For those variables that appear in both the selection and outcome equations, the coefficients in the outcome equations are affected by the coefficients in the selection equation. The outcome coefficients estimate the probability of a coup succeeding conditional on a putsch having been attempted in the first place.
The main hypothesis posited that the presence of spatial rivalry is likely to increase the probability of coups. As we can see from Models 1 through 3, the results are congruent with the key theoretical expectation: autocrats invested in territorial disputes with foreign rivals are more prone to be ousted in a coup d'état. Spatial rivalry is consistently associated with attempts and successes across alternative specifications that account for factors conventionally associated with coups. To assess the substantive impact of territorial rivalry on the outcome of interest, I estimated the conditional marginal effects of spatial rivalry on coup success. 99 Holding all other variables constant, we can notice an increase of 33.4 percent in the likelihood of coup success in the presence of spatial rivalry for the full model (Model 3). 100 To further illustrate how spatial rivalry influences the outcome of interest, Figure   1 displays the effect of spatial rivalry on the change in the predicted probability of coups at different levels of GDP per capita (logged). 101 Altogether, it can be observed that the probability of a coup against dictators increases when authoritarian regimes are embroiled in territorial disputes. The effect of spatial rivalry on the change in the predicted probability of coups is positive and statistically different from 0. At the same time, the impact of spatial rivalry is greater at lower levels of GDP per capita, such that, all else equal, a dispute over territory can increase the overall probability of a coup happening by at least 5 percent. At higher levels of GDP per capita, the effect of spatial rivalry is more modest, although it does remain statistically significant. These trends suggest that, where dictators manage to maintain a relatively high standard of living (an example is Singapore during the "benevolent" dictatorship of Lee Kuan Yew, 1965 -1990 , the impact of spatial rivalry on the likelihood of a coup is significantly lower.
Overall, the relationship between spatial rivalry and coups exhibits robust statistical significance, and empirically corroborates the mechanisms that link the presence of territorial disputes to greater organizational power, coordination, and political leverage for the military establishment. Autocrats have much to fear when the country is involved in territorial disputes. As shown consistently in the rivalry literature, these type of disputes are more likely to escalate to outright warfare; 102 additionally, the presence of external threat is likely to produce an organizationally effective military, one that may find itself in an auspicious position to attempt and successfully carry out a coup. The empirical patterns revealed across Models 1 through 3 present an alternative to the conventional view in the civil-military literature which posits that the presence of external threat makes the military less likely to 100 The baseline probability of coup success with no spatial rivalry stands at 0.09. The probability of a successful putch increases to 0.13 when the regime is engaged in a territorial dispute with a foreign rival.
101 As can be seen in Table 1 , GDP per capita (logged) is a consistent inhibitor of coups. challenge the executive's authority. Foundational studies on civil-military relations hold that increasing resources, autonomy, and organizational power of the army produces congenial or "positive" civil-military relations 103 The findings herein suggest that this is not always the case. Rather than coalesce domestic actors against a common enemy, external threatsterritorial disputes, in particular -can also create opportunities for the army to consolidate its organizational leverage and can, thus, enhance its ability to successfully depose an authoritarian leader. 104 While there is ample evidence pointing to a strong connection between spatial rivalry and coups, the estimates for the other types of rivalry (positional, ideological, and interventionist) are less promising. As Models 1 through 3 show, the coefficients for positional and ideological rivalries fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
At the same time, suggestive evidence indicates that, all else equal, coups are less likely to be attempted in the presence of interventionist rivalries. This is an expected pattern since foreign interventions weaken national armies and leave them incapacitated to coordinate a coup. 104 Note that the logic here applies to the presence of external threat, not to the presence of war. Autocrats might use territorial disputes to initiate conflict and rally the population around the war effort. Cubic splines included in all specifications but not reported. Table 1 suggest that interstate war is positively associated with coup attempts but not with coup successes. Again, this finding necessitates a more elaborate investigation.
Speculatively, while a certain faction of the army may seize the opportunity to initiate a coup attempt while the regime fights a war, the remaining officers may be reluctant to partake in the attempted takeover because they may be apprehensive of potential defeat and subsequent loss of status within the military establishment. It is also worth mentioning that the presence or number of MIDs are not systematically related to coup outcomes, even in alternative specifications where the rivalry covariates are dropped due to collinearity concerns with the MID variables.
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The empirical results also leave us circumspect about the connection between the presence of internal conflict and coups. The civil war covariate fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Civil war remains insignificant across all models which suggests that its impact may be marginal once we account for the wider palette of structural coup-drivers.
When it comes to the other variables, we observe that the covariate capturing the change in military expenditures is consistently significant in the outcome equations, suggesting a lower likelihood of coup success when greater resources are allocated for the army. This finding is intuitive given that the covariate for military expenditures proxies for resources funnelled into buying the satisfaction and loyalty of army officers. Hence, while a certain segment of the military establishment might attempt regime overthrow for political reasons, the coup ploy is likely to unravel when the larger officer corps is satisfied with the level of resource allocations to the armed forces. Another consistent inhibitor of coups is the level of economic development, measured by logged GDP per capita. The estimates across all specifications indicate that both coup attempt and coup success are unlikely to occur when an authoritarian regime manages to maintain relatively high levels of economic development.
As argued in the existing literature, good economic performance lowers the general public's 
Conclusion
To the unseasoned observer, dictators may look like carefree individuals fully absorbed by the mirage of power. At closer scrutiny, autocrats live a far more precarious life. This is because they need to permanently look over their shoulder and be mindful of potential coups certain structural conditions that work to bolster the organizational power of the military.
This article examined the impact of one such structural condition on the military's ability to carry out a coup against a dictator: spatial rivalry -international competition over territory. Spatial rivalry can undercut a despot's coup-proofing measures by increasing the autonomy, strength, and organizational resources of the army. In essence, territorial disputes with foreign rivals create a fundamental moral hazard in authoritarian regimes: the very resources that enable the armed forces to compete internationally also consolidate its domestic leverage and empower it to act against a dictator. The results consistently showed that the presence of an external rival is associated with a higher likelihood of coups. This does not imply that generals execute coups because of spatial rivalry dynamics. Rather, the argument advanced herein is more nuanced: rivalry operates as a structural condition that enhances the army's ability to supply coups. International competition over territory provides avenues for the military to consolidate its institutional power, coordinate collective action efforts, undermine an autocrat's coup-proofing strategies, and execute a coup when propitious conditions arise. Besides spatial rivalry, this study also investigated the effect of three other structural coup-drivers -internal instability, civil war, and international conflict -on coups. Both domestic instability and interstate war were systematically associated with coup attempts but not with coup outcomes, a pattern that warrants further analysis.
The results for the impact of civil war were inconclusive, particularly in light of existing studies in which internal conflict emerges as a significant coup-driver. 111 Therefore, more attention needs to be given to the relationship between war, of intrastate or interstate fabric, and coups.
The findings have theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretically, this study contributes to the growing body of works that examine the link between international competition and coups. In particular, there seems to be some consensus around the idea that 
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Robustness tests
Models 4 through 9 in Tables A1 and A2 present a range of additional tests which indicate that the main results are robust to the use of an alternative civil war variable, the inclusion of two other controls (the presence of coups in adjacent countries, and oil revenues per capita), the exclusion of the interstate war and MID covariates due to collinearity concerns with the spatial rivalry variable, the exclusion of all rivalry variables, and the substitution of cubic splines with a cubic polynomial of duration.
Model 4 examines whether the results remain consistent when the COW civil war variable is replaced with the UCDP civil war variable (which relies on a 25 battle-related casualty threshold compared to COW's 1,000 battle-deaths threshold). As can be seen from Table   A1 , the UCDP civil war categorization does not substantially changes the nature of the main result. Spatial rivalry remains a significant predictor of coup attempt and success. The only notable difference is that the UCDP civil war covariate emerges as a statistically significant predictor of coup onset. This pattern could be an artifact of civil war conceptualization and measurement since UCDP's 25 battle-related casualty threshold may conflate civil war with other forms of domestic contention. The fact that the instability variable loses its significance once the COW civil war variable is replaced with the UCDP one seems to support this conjecture.
Model 5 investigates the possibility that military coups may exhibit demonstration effects and may, thus, influence putsches in neighboring countries. 1 Events in a neighboring state could either precipitate or inhibit coups against autocrats. Generals may learn from foreign peers about how to successfully mount a coup or officers in adjacent states may assist with the coup planning and execution stages; conversely, failed coups in the neighborhood may signal to the army top-brass that ousting a dictator is an onerous undertaking that can jeopardize their political survival and physical security. As can be seen from Table A1 , the dichotomous indicator marking the presence of coups in an adjacent country hints at a higher likelihood of coups attempts when coup-making activities are present in a neighboring state, but fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Hence, these results do not support any "coup contagion" effect.
Model 6 controls for oil revenues per capita (logged) with data taken from one of the most comprehensive studies on oil and conflict.
2 Oil income may be directly tied to autocratic regime survival: oil wealth increases military spending in dictatorships and, according to recent research, may function as a coup deterrent.
3 When looking at the results in Model 6, we observe that oil wealth emerges as a significant inhibitor of coup attempt, but not coup success -a pattern which suggests that dictators can use oil rents to buy off officers or subsidize the creation of parallel structures of authority that are directly under their authority.
It is worth noting that the inclusion of the oil revenues per capita control does not alter the key findings.
Model 7 probes whether the results remain consistent when the interstate war and MID variables are excluded due to collinearity concerns with spatial rivalry. As can be seen from Cubic splines included in all specifications but not reported. Cubic splines included Models 7 and 8 but not reported. Cubic polynomial of duration included in Model 9 but not reported. 
